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In this paper, we investigate the effects of installment receipt IPOs on the short term and long 
term prices of the underlying securities. Our findings are that: there exist both short term and 
long term trends in prices implying that investors view the issue as a bargain and therefore 
buy the issue for both short term and long term gains; that the dominant factor affecting 
investor uncertainty is the level of confidence attached to the underwriter; and that for 
installment receipt IPOs, investors have the time leverage to monitor the activities of the firm 




An installment receipt (IR) is a corporate security which represents a share that is held by the 
bearer, but only partially paid for. With IRs, the investor purchases a company’s security by paying a 
portion of the price today and the remainder at a pre-specified future date. The holder of IR enjoys 
the full rights of owning the common share of a corporation. That is, the holder is entitled to vote and 
receive the same dividend as a common shareholder. Should the corporation be dissolved, the 
distribution of residual value would accrue to the holder of the installment receipt as it would to the 
common shareholder.  
 
The holder of IR, however, has the obligation to make the specified installment payments on 
the date(s)  specified in the prospectus. If the offering is done by way of two installments, the bearer 
of the first IR has the obligation to purchase the final installment unless the bearer decides to sell it 
prior to the final installment date in which case, the obligation is transferred to the new holder of the 
IR. Upon payment of the final installment, the first and second receipts are immediately exchanged 
for the common share of the underlying firm and there is no longer a market for the receipts. The 
common share then trades at a price which is a combination of the market price of the first IR 
immediately preceding the final installment payment date and the full amount of the final IR. In a 
three installment offering, the first installment ceases trading on the second installment date and the 
security trades as a combination of the market price of the first IR and the full amount of the second 
installment. On the final installment date, the receipt is immediately exchanged for a common share 
of the firm. The non-purchase of the final installment still leaves the bearer liable to the seller. The 
issuer (normally called the selling shareholder in IPOs) reacquires title to the shares and may sell 
them in the market. However, the bearer of the installment receipt is liable to the issuer for any 
defficiency from the sale of the IR.  
 
While the selling of installment receipt IPOs has been used for several decades, the practice 
has become more popular in recent years.  In Canada, they have been used for the privatization of 
Crown corporations. As noted by Haggett (1996), Canadian governments (both federal and 
provincial) have found installment receipts as a means to market the issue to their constituents who 
might otherwise be unable to raise the necessary amount of cash to investment in the newly 
privatized operations.  
 
The IR investor faces a reduced risk than would be experienced in an equity IPO for the same 
company.  This is because investor has sometime (normally one year) to monitor the performance of 
the company before committing the remaining capital. If the investor is not satisfied with the firm's 
performance, he/she could trade out of his/her position prior to that date. Likewise, any potential IR 
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investor who did not purchase the first installment has the opportunity to monitor the performance of 
the new company before deciding to purchase the installment receipt from the market, and the 
obligation for the final installment. 
 
So long as the holder of IR receives the full amount of any dividends declared by the 
corporation, the yield on IR is enhanced during the installment period. This makes IRs attractive to 
potential investors given that the investor risks less capital upfront. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
The pricing of IPOs is difficult partly because there is no observable market price prior to the 
offering and partly because many of the issuing firms have little or no operational history. Thus, 
setting the price too low will hurt the issuing firm, too high will be unattractive to the informed 
investor. Moreover, investors may refrain from investing in IPOs from underwriters with a record of 
overpriced offerings. However, empirical evidence shows that IPOs are significantly underpriced, on 
average. Though a number of reasons have been offered to explain the underpricing, yet no widely 
accepted statistical test has been advanced to explain IPO underpricing.  
 
The phenomenon of  significant underpricing in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) 
has been well documented over the past quarter century.  Empirical evidence of short term abnormal 
returns, on average, for investors in IPOs has been provided by several researchers (See for example; 
Ibbotson, 1975; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Chalk and Peavy, 1987; Miller and Reilly, 1987; Ibbotson, 
Affleck-Graves and Miller, 1988; and Sindelar and Ritter, 1988).  As noted by Affleck-Graves and 
Miller (1988), the consensus from the research is that IPOs are, on average, underpriced by greater 
than 10%.  While most research on IPOs has been focussed on U.S. securities, others (Jog and 
Riding, 1987; Menyah, Paudayal, and Inyangete, 1990; and, Levis, 1993; Clarkson and Merkely, 
1994) have found consistent results in other countries. Levis (1993) confirmed that a significant IPO 
underpricing exists in capital markets worldwide. Jog and Riding (1987) found that Canadian IPOs 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) between 1971 and 1983 were underpriced, on average, 
by 9 to 11.5 per cent.  Clarkson and Merkely (1994) also studied TSE IPOs from 1984 to 1987 and 
found that the average initial period return was 6.44%. In addition, both studies confirmed that, 
consistent with the findings of other countries, a significant portion of the IPOs were overpriced.  Jog 
and Riding (1987) found that about 40% of the securities in their sample were overpriced.  Clarkson 
and Merkely (1994) indicated that 30% of their stocks were overpriced while another 15% exhibited 
no initial period price change.  
 
 In most studies of equity IPOs (for example, Miller and Reilly, 1987; Ibbotson, Affleck-
Graves and Miller, 1988; and Sindelar and Ritter, 1988), significant abnormal returns were found to 
be generated in the initial trading period and that the market adjusted to any abnormal returns during 
the first day of trading. The observed underpricing in IPOs has normally been explained in terms of 
the ex-ante uncertainty faced by the potential investor. It is the underwriter’s responsibility to 
structure and market the new issue. Essentially, the underwriter becomes familiar with the company’s 
history and future prospects, including its competitive position within its industry, its track record, 
and its financial structure and expected earnings. Once the company’s preliminary prospectus is 
released, the underwriter takes the company’s story to potential investors. Thus, the underwriter has 
his/her reputation at risk.  If the market indicates that the price was set too low, future issuers may 
not contract the underwriter; if it was set too high, investors may be alienated from participating in 
future IPOs arranged by that underwriter.  There is also the possibility that an overpriced issue might 
generate lawsuits from buyers who have subsequently found that their investment has declined in 
value.  Therefore, underpricing has been explained terms of insurance against legal liability (see 
Tinic, 1988).  
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Though IPOs have been documented to be underpriced on average, it is important to note 
that a significant number of IPO issues are also overpriced.  Ibbotson (1975) found that, while IPOs 
on average generate positive excess returns, he was unable to reject the hypothesis that an investor 
had an equal chance for a gain or a loss. Researchers have proposed several explanations for the 
phenomenon of  IPO mispricing.  Much attention has been directed towards theories of ex ante 
uncertainty and asymmetry of information amongst the participants (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986; Miller and Reilly, 1987; and Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1989). Rock (1986) proposed that 
there are two classes of investor, informed and uninformed.  He suggested that IPOs had to be priced 
below their expected values in order to attract uninformed investors to both good and bad issues.  
Otherwise, there would be insufficient demand for bad issues given that informed investors would 
not participate. 
 
  Beatty and Ritter (1986), measured initial returns against two proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty, namely; the issue size and the use of the proceeds from the issue.  They concluded that a 
positive relationship existed although the strength of the relationship was weak. Affleck-Graves, 
Hedge, Miller, and Reilly (1993) used the listing requirements of different U.S. exchanges as a proxy 
for ex ante uncertainty. They found that the more stringent the listing standards, the lower the degree 
of underpricing experienced for the new issue.  Jog and Riding (1987) and Clarkson and Merkley 
(1994) tested several proxies for ex-ante uncertainty against observed returns for Canadian IPOs.  
Both studies produced results that were consistent with earlier U.S. studies. 
 
Empirical results of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) IPOs have been mixed ( see 
Wang, Chan, and Gau 1992; Ling and Ryngaert 1997). Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) found that the 
initial return for REITs was significantly negative, on average, by 2.82%.  In addition, they found 
that new REITs continued to underperform seasoned REITs in the aftermarket.  The returns showed 
no significant relationship with the measures of ex-ante uncertainty.  They offered a possible 
explanation that the issues were aggressively marketed to retail investors and that better informed 
institutional investors were not large participants in the REIT market. In contrast to the findings of 
Wang, Chan and Gau (1992),  Ling and Ryngaert (1997) found that REIT IPOs issued between 1991 
and 1994 displayed an average underpricing of 3.6% and outperformed seasoned REITs in the 
aftermarket. Moreover, they found a significant relationship between REIT IPO initial returns and the 
measures of ex-ante uncertainty.  They noted that there was far greater institutional ownership of 
REITs in the 1990s as compared to prior periods and that REITs had become more visible as yield 
instruments in an era of low interest rates.   
 
So far the explanations for underpricing include price stabilization by the underwriter (Ruud, 
1991; and Bhagwan, Chowdry, and Nanda, 1996); signalling the future value of the firm to new 
investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; and Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989); insurance against the legal 
liabilities of the underwriter (Tinic, 1988); underwriter reputation (Beatty and Ritter, 1986); and the 
periods of high and low volumes of IPO activity (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 1988). 
 
In this paper, we investigate the extent of mispricing of installment receipt IPOs. Further, we 
investigate the aftermarket adjustment of prices to the initial mispricing of installment receipt IPO 
and as well, examine the factors that contribute to the initial mispricing. Since installment receipt 
IPOs, unlike equity IPOs,  have two event dates namely; the first installment trading date and the 
final installment trading date, we decompose investor uncertainty into two components: that due to 
the underwriter with which carries the obligation to purchase the final installment receipt, and that 
due to the issuer. 
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Data  Sources and Selection 
 
The initial selection of installment receipt IPO securities were obtained from the “Partly Paid 
Shares” section of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) daily returns listing in the Globe and Mail. 
Initially forty firms were identified which had issued installment receipt IPOs between January 1, 
1994 and July 1, 1997.   
 
The prospectus was obtained for each issue.  The price per installment, number of 
installments, installment dates, and issue size were recorded.  Using information from the 
prospectuses, four securities were excluded because the receipts represented convertible debentures, 
or were sold as a unit including a debenture or a warrant with a common share. 
 
Daily volume and closing price for each of the securities was obtained from two primary 
sources: the TD Securities Inc. and Reuters Canada.  For shares paid in two installments, data was 
requested for the first installment receipt from the date it was issued until the date of the final 
installment payment.  Data for the fully paid share was requested for a period of two months 
following the payment of the final installment.  For shares paid in three installments, data for the 
second installment receipt was requested from the date of the second installment payment until the 
date of the final payment.  Any gaps in the daily data for individual IRs, were filled by consulting the 
daily returns for the Toronto Stock Exchange in the Globe and Mail or the Financial Post.  Another 
four securities were excluded, at this stage, because insufficient data was obtained from the primary 
sources.  Dividends were obtained from the Financial Post Quarterly Review of Dividends and the 
Bloomberg Financial News wire service. 
 
Two other securities were eventually excluded from the sample.  Boliden Ltd. installment 
receipts (BOL.ir) were suspended from trading on the TSE on May 27, 1998 when their value 
became negative.  Shiningbank Energy Income Fund (SHN.ir) issued a second series of the first 
installment at a date between installment payments.  A final sample of thirty securities was, 
therefore, available for this analysis.    
 
Of the thirty firms included in the sample, the minimum issue size was $35m, while the 
maximum issue size was $2.29bn with an average issue size of $460m 
                                                              
Methodology 
 
IPO underpricing has been linked to the effects of investor uncertainty. Several proxies are 
used in statistical models to capture the effects of investor uncertainty. These include, among others, 
issue size, age of the firm, alternative uses for the proceeds from the issue specified by the offering, 
the listing requirements of the exchanges, quality of underwriter and IPO market conditions. The 
claim is that investor uncertainty causes market friction and pricing inefficiency. While it is well 
documented that IPOs are, on average, underpriced there is no consensus on the aftermarket 
adjustment to the mispricing. This is because some researchers define the aftermarket in terms of one 
week period, while others define it in terms of one month period.  
 
In all of these studies, it was also shown that abnormal returns were available only in the 
initial trading period.  Ibbotson (1975) noted that there were few deviations from efficiency in the 
aftermarket trading in new securities.  Miller and Reilly (1987) found that the market adjusted to any 
mispricing during the first day of trading.  Excess returns were not available in the aftermarket for 
either underpriced or overpriced IPOs. 
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In this paper, we investigate the validity of the competing hypotheses on equity IPOs for 
installment receipts IPOs. First, we examine whether or not there are short term and long term trends 
in prices of underpriced and overpriced installment receipt IPOs. To achieve this, we postulate the 
following cross-sectional relationship: 
            
        CR2i = γ 0 + γ 1CR1i + γ 2 D1i + γ 3 D1iCR1i + ε i                                                             (1)                  
        where, 
                 CR2i  = Cumulative returns for the final IR up to and including the first week of 
trading, 
                CR1i  = Cumulative returns for the first IR over the first week of trading, 
                 D1i  = 1 if the installment receipt IPO is underpriced and zero otherwise, and 
                  ε i  is the error term. 
 
The rationale behind equation (1) is that if there is any significant degree of 
underpricing/overpricing of IR by the investment banker would cause underreaction or overreaction 
in the market. For this reason, we should  expect the coefficient γ 1 to be negative. A negative  γ 1 
value therefore represents short term trends in prices. On the other hand if γ 1 is positive and 
significant would indicate long term persistence in prices which has implications for market 
efficience with respect to installment receipt IPOs.  
 
Next, we examine whether the sign of the initial IR return is a predictor of its aftermarket 
return, both short and long term. To test this, we postulate the following models: 
     
         CR1i = γ 0 + γ 1R1i + γ 2D1i + γ 3D1iR1i + ε i                                                                  (2)                  
       and 
          CR2i = γ 0 + γ 1 R1i + γ 2CR1i + γ 3D1i + γ 4 D1i R1i + γ 5D1iCR1i + ε i                                
(3)                                                                         
 where, 
                 R1i  =  Returns for the first trading day of IR, and 
                   CR2i  , CR1i  and D1i  are as previously defined, 
                   ε i  is the error term. 
 
Equation (2) examines the short term direction of trends in prices condotional upon the 
initial signal, while equation (3) examines the long term direction of trends in prices conditional 
upon the initial signal. 
 
Finally, we examine the effects of investor uncertainty induced by the uncertainty 
surrounding investment banker's subjective evaluation of the initial pricing of the installment receipts 
as well as the uncertainty surrounding the issuing firm. We postulate the following relationship:    
         
        R2i = γ 0 + γ 1R1i + γ 2V1i + γ 3V2i + γ 4 Di + γ 5 D1iR1i + γ 6D1iV1i + γ 7D1iV2i + ε i                
(4)                                                                          
        where, 
                 V1i  = Proportionate volume of trade during the first trading day of the IR, 
                 V2i  = Proportionate volume of trade during the first trading day of the final IR, 
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                 D1i  = 1 if the installment receipt IPO is underpriced and zero otherwise, and 
                  ε i  is the error term. 
 
  In equation (4), V1i  measures the investor degree of uncertainty induced solely by the 
investment banker pricing mechanism, while  V2i  reflects the investor degree of uncertainty due to 
the firm's characteristics. 
 
Analyis of Results 
 
  The results of the behavior of returns during the first day of trading for the first installment 
receipts and the fully converted share is shown in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 
Underpricing/overpricing of IR IPOs during the first trading day of the first and final IRs 
 
   Day 1 trading of the 
first Installment Receipt  
 Day 1 trading of the 
 fully converted Receipts  
















  19   14.872   9.27   0.6251   1.864   2.751   1.470 
Overpriced  
securities 
 7   -4.730   5.518   -1.167   0.807   1.588   2.548 
Total sample   30   8.315   7.610   0.9152   0.951   2.423   2.548 
        
 
The results seem to be consistent with those reported for equity IPO's. Installment Receipts 
(IR's), like equity IPO's, on average, tend to be underpriced in the market. During the first trading day 
of the Installment Receipts, a positive average returns of 8.32% was realized for the thirty firms. 
During the same period, the underpriced IPO's realized a net gain of 14.67%, while the overpriced 
IPO's realized a net loss of 4.73%. The degree of underpricing/overpricing is almost eliminated by 
the time the final IR's are paid and the receipts fully converted into common shares.      
 
Since installment receipt IPOs are to some extent identical to equity IPOs we can only test 
the proposed models using cross-sectional data on the firms. However, as with any cross-sectional 
data the residuals from OLS regressions are heteroscedastic which may bias the t-test statistics. Thus, 
we face the risk of wrongly accepting the null hypotheses when in fact they should be rejected. To 
correct for this problem, we employ three estimating techniques, namely, the OLS, a Heteroscedastic 
Estimation technique and a Simulation technique. The results for equation (1) are shown in Table 2 
below: 
         
Table 2 
 
 Test results for the presence of long term and short term trends in prices of underpriced and 
overpriced IRs (equation 1) 
        MODEL:    CR1i = γ 0 + γ 1R1i + γ 2D1i + γ 3D1iR1i + ε i  
       
  γ 0  γ 1 γ 2  γ 3  
OLS Coefficient 0.005048 0.0542 0.2065 0.0348 
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 t-statistics 0.783 1.025 0.257 0.875 
GLS Coefficient 0.005126 0.0621 0.2082 0.0342 
 t-statistics 1.982 2.051 1.635 2.354 
SIM Coefficient 0.005130 0.0598 0.2078 0.0344 
 t-statistics 2.245 2.128 1.687 2.535 
 
The results for the tests of short term and long term trends in prices confirm that  investors 
purchase IRs with the intention of making long term gain from their investment. The OLS results 
failed to confirm this assertion due partly to the relatively small sample size and partly due to the 
effect of heteroscedasticity in the residual term of the model. Both the GLS and the simulation 
techniques confirm this assertion. The coefficients are all positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level for the GLS and the simulation techniques. Finally, we test for the effect of investor 
uncertainty on the prices of the IRs using equation (4). 
 
To achieve these, we decompose investor uncertainty into two components, namely that due 
to the underwriter, and that due to the issuing firm. We postulate that the uncertainty due to the 
underwriter is reflected in the volume of trade for the installment receipt first trading day, while that 
due to the issuing firm is reflected in the volume of trade for the final installment first trading day. 




The statistical results for tests of investor uncertainty in periods surrounding the first and final 
installment receipt trading days.  
MODEL: R2i = γ 0 + γ 1R1i + γ 2V1i + γ 3V2i + γ 4 Di + γ 5 D1iR1i + γ 6D1iV1i + γ 7D1iV2i + ε i     
  γ 0  γ 1 γ 2  γ 3  γ 4  γ 5  γ 6  γ 7  
OLS Coefficient -0.0068 0.0244 0.0858 0.3887 -0.074 0.1633 -0.0345 0.1265 
 t-statistics -0.678 1.128 1.456 0.865 -1.087 0.984 -1.113 1.012 
GLS Coefficient -0.0124 0.0286 0.0784 0.4235 -0.0821 0.1845 -0.0421 0.1324 
 t-statistics -1.145 4.989 3.132 2.154 -1.128 1.876 -2.165 1.654 
SIM Coefficient -0.072 0.0274 0.0794 0.435 -0.0945 0.178 -0.0456 0.146 
 t-statistics -1.348 5.135 3.876 3.186 -1.564 1.934 -1.986 1.879 
          
 
The results indicate that investors uncertainty about the IPO is accounted for by both the risk 
attached to the underwriter and the uncertainty surrounding the issuing firm. Of the total risk faced 
by the investor, approximately  65% is accounted for by uncertainty about the underwriter while 25% 
is accounted for by uncertainty surrounding the issuing firm. A plausible explanation to this finding 
is that investors engaged in installment receipt purchases have a long time span to monitor the 
activities of the issuing firm in order to decide on whether or not to make a commitment to buy and 




In this paper, we investigate the effects of installment receipt IPOs on the short term and long 
term prices of the underlying securities. Our findings are that: there exist both short term and long 
term trends in prices implying that investors view the issue as a bargain and therefore buy the issue 
for both short term and long term gains; that the dominant factor affecting investor uncertainty is the 
level of confidence attached to the underwriter; and that for installment receipt IPOs, investors have 
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the time leverage to monitor the activities of the firm before making a commitment to purchase the 
security.    
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